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1 Introduction
A central issue in the economics of innovation is how patent policy may a¤ect innovative
activities. The recent literature has examined this issue in the context of cumulative innova-
tion, where discoveries build on each other, under a standard assumption that rms pursue
innovations along a single research direction. In many industries, however, rms can con-
duct R&D in multiple directions to achieve a specic goal, as, for example, the development
of a next generation color copier in the early 1990s by Fuji Xerox, of a new mobile system
by Ericsson in the mid-1990s, and of an X Terminal workstation by the Hewlett Packard in
the late 1980s (Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2001).1 The purpose of this paper is to inquire
how patent policy, specically patentability standards, may a¤ect the rate and direction of
cumulative innovation in an industry where rms can conduct R&D in multiple directions.
We consider a situation where there are two research directions, A and B, for a sequence
of innovations (or new products) that deliver higher product qualities over time. The quality
improvement of an innovation in direction B may range stochastically from low to high while
that in direction A is at some intermediate level. Hence, if an innovation is patentable only
when its quality improvement (or innovation size) is su¢ ciently large, as for instance implied
by the requirement of a minimum inventive step, there will be a range of quality thresholds,
or patentability standards (S); under which innovations in direction A are always patentable
but an innovation in direction B may not. We will focus on patentability standards in the
interior of such a range, and call A the safe direction while B the risky direction.2
If innovation is a one-time activity that ends with the successful introduction of a new
product, a (marginally) higher patentability standard would discourage R&D in the risky
direction by making it harder to obtain a patent and the rents associated with it through
1 In particular, facing the possible emergence of a third-generation mobile system with high bandwidth,
Ericsson in the mid-1990s funded research teams to separately develop two di¤erent standards: a more radical
new technology called WCDMA and a new standard called EDGE upgrading the existing technologies.
2That is, we consider patentability standards that are high enough to exceed the left tail of innovations
in the risky direction but not so high to make a safe innovation not patentable. We rule out by assumption
situations where patentability standards are so high that a safe innovation is not patentable but a risky one
can (in which case the problem would be reduced to analyzing innovations only in the risky direction).
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this direction, which we shall call the threshold e¤ect, whereas it would have no impact on
R&D in the safe direction, provided that there are no (dis)economies of scope in R&D and
that the return to a successful patentable discovery in one direction is not diminished by that
in the other. In this static setting, a higher S reduces industry R&D through the threshold
e¤ect, and it also allocates relatively more resources in the safe direction than in the risky
direction, which can reduce the expected size of innovation if a successful innovation through
the risky direction has a higher expected quality improvement than that through the safe
direction.
The issue is more complex if innovations are cumulative, as we assume in this paper.
Specically, we consider the following model that builds on and extends Hunt (2004) by
having two research directions: Suppose that n + 1 rms have entered an industry. At
any time, one of them is the leader and the other n rms are challengers. The challengers
are in a patent race to develop a new product that improves upon the current leaders.
When a challenger succeeds in a patentable innovation, it becomes the new leader to replace
the current one, who then joins the rank of challengers; and this process repeats itself
indenitely. In this dynamic setting, a marginal increase in the patentability standard will
increase the value of being a leader because it will take longer before the leader is replaced
by a successful challenger. This incumbency-prolonging e¤ect can potentially increase the
incentive for R&D in both innovation directions, even though the threshold e¤ect from a
higher S will still have a negative impact on the incentive for R&D in the risky direction.3
Moreover, the changes in the R&D incentives in the two di¤erent directions will inter-
act with each other, giving rise to a dynamic strategic substitution e¤ect between the two
directions: When the R&D intensity in one direction becomes higher (or lower), it exerts
an opposite force on the R&D intensity in the other direction. In particular, an increase of
3 It has been found in the literature that innovation and competition may have a non-monotonic rela-
tionship because, while more intense competition may lower rents from a single innovation, it could increase
innovation incentives under cumulative innovation due to the dynamic e¤ect and the desire to escape com-
petition (Aghion et al., 2005) The incumbency-prolonging e¤ect is also due to the dynamic e¤ect, but it
works through the channel of patentability standards.
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R&D in one direction induces the next innovation discovery to come sooner, which lowers
the prot from incumbency and thus reduces the incentive for R&D in the other direction.
This turns out to be the crucial force that leads to new e¤ects of patentability standards
under multiple research directions.
Finally, as we shall assume, a rm needs to incur a xed cost to enter the market in
order to conduct R&D and innovate. Therefore, patentability standards, by impacting the
expected return to R&D in each direction, also a¤ects the number of entrants in the free
entry equilibrium. Our analysis will examine how this market-structure e¤ect interacts with
the other forces in the model.
We nd that as patentability standards rise, R&D intensity in the risky direction rst
rises and then falls, exhibiting an inverted-U shape, whereas R&D intensity in the safe
direction is U-shaped, initially decreasing and then increasing. Thus, the incumbency-
prolonging e¤ect is the dominating force in the risky direction when S is low, but it is
dominated by the negative threshold e¤ect when S is high. More surprising is that despite
the positive impact from the incumbency-prolonging e¤ect, increases in S initially lower
R&D in the safe direction, due to the strategic substitution e¤ect.
We also nd that as S increases, the industry rate of innovation initially goes up and even-
tually falls down, reaching its maximum at some intermediate level. The market-structure
e¤ect plays a balancing role: there will be more rms when the expected return from R&D
investment is higher, which moderates the e¤ects of patentability standards on R&D inten-
sities both for each rm and for the industry.
We further compare the market equilibrium with the solutions that maximize social
welfare. First, in relation to the rst-best innovation rate, we show that R&D intensities
and the number of entrants in the free entry equilibrium are decient. This is due to the
familiar intuition that a rms private innovation incentive does not internalize the positive
externalities to consumers.4 Second, compared to the rst-best innovation direction, we nd
4 In our model, consumers benet from a non-patentable innovation immediately. For a patentable inno-
vation, the increase in equillibirum price o¤sets the consumer gain from the quality improvement during the
4
that there exists a critical value of patentability standard, S^; such that the equilibrium R&D
direction coincides with the rst best when S = S^; and it is biased towards (against) the
risky direction when S is below (above) S^.5 For the second-best social welfare maximization
problem, in which a hypothetical social planner can only set the patentability standard
but not the R&D and entry activities of rms, the optimal S balances the three goals of
moving towards the socially optimal innovation rate, towards the socially optimal innovation
direction, and towards the socially optimal market structure. Thus, in general, the second
best patentability standard will be di¤erent from S^; from the S that maximizes the number
of innovating rms, and from the S that maximizes the rate of innovation either for an
individual rm or for the industry.
Our paper is related to the existing theoretical literature on patents and cumulative inno-
vation, which has studied models with R&D along a single direction and o¤ered mixed nd-
ings on the e¤ects of patent protection. For example, ODonoghue (1998) and ODonoghue
et al. (1998) suggest that stronger patent protection has positive e¤ects on the rate of
innovation, provided that ex-ante agreement or contracting between innovators is e¢ cient,
whereas Bessen and Maskin (2009) and Segal and Whinston (2007) nd cases where the
e¤ects are negative. Horowitz and Lai (1996) consider a model in which longer patents
increase the size but decrease the frequency of the innovation. They show that the patent
length that maximizes the rate of innovation is nite (or intermediate).6 As we mentioned
earlier, our model is most closely related to Hunt (2004), who studies patentability and
period, but the consumer gain is realized once the next innovation replaces the current one so that the new
price only reects the new quality improvement. Thus consumers benet from a patentable innovoation not
immediately but dynamically. Notice that, under competition, there is also a business-stealing e¤ect that
potentially results in excessive R&D and entry. In our model, as in Hunt (2004), the positive externality
dominates.
5 Intuitively, when S is low, innovations in the risky direction are patentable even when the quality
improvement is small, which motives socially excessive R&D in the risky direction, relative to the safe
direction: And the opposite is true when S is high. Since we measure innovation or R&D direction by the
ratio of R&D intensities in the two directions, R&D can be e¢ cient in both directions and yet biased towards
one direction.
6Chen et al. (2014) nd that stronger patent protection can a¤ect cumulative innovation either positively
or negatively, and the e¤ect is generally non-monotonic. Empirically, some recent studies on cumulative
innovation (Murray et al., 2007; Furman and Stern, 2011; Galasso and Schankerman, 2013; Williams, 2013;
Sampat and Williams, 2014) nd no evidence of a relationship.
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cumulative innovation in a model with R&D only in one direction that corresponds to the
risky direction in our paper. By allowing multiple R&D directions, we introduce the impor-
tant strategic substitution e¤ect and o¤er several new insights. In particular, in contrast to
the result in Hunt that the patentability standard a¤ects innovation only through a market
structure e¤ect, with no impact on each innovating rms R&D intensity, we show that it also
a¤ects innovation through its impact on R&D intensities, in ways that are non-monotonic
and somewhat unexpected. Thus, in our model, patentability standards a¤ect industry in-
novation through both the extensive margin (number of entrants) and the intensive margin
(R&D intensities). Moreover, our results on innovation (or R&D) direction are novel in this
literature.
Our paper is also related to a large literature, broadly dened as on R&D portfolio and
the direction of innovation. Earlier studies have focused on the issue of how competition
may a¤ect the choice between safe and risky research projects for a stand-alone innovation.7
Some authors have found, under the assumption of winner-take-all, that competition leads
to over-investment in risky R&D projects because it magnies the negative externality of
investment by one rm on other rmsprobability to win the patent.8 Others, however,
have argued that investment in risky R&D project decreases with the strength of competi-
tion, because the negative externality of the risky R&D becomes small when competition
strengthens, if each rm pursues multiple patents (Cabral, 1994; Kwon, 2010).9 Recent
studies have examined sequential innovation. Acemoglu (2011) considers a model with se-
quential innovation and multiple research paths but only one research path is commercially
7Acemoglu (2002) argues that prot incentives may shape the direction of technical change and therefore
determine the equilibrium bias of technology.
8 In a classic paper, Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) show that in R&D races rms select a too high expected
rate of technological changes which, in most cases, induces excessively risky research projects (see also
Bhattacharya and Mookherjee, 1986; Klette and de Meza, 1986).
9Relatedly, Anderson and Cabral (2007) study a game where rms choose the variance of a stochastic
innovation outcome. They nd that the level of equilibrium variance may be greater, smaller, or equal to the
social optimum. Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein (2008) provide a framework for evaluating the advantages
and disadvantages of academic research as opposed to private-sector research and show that it is possible
for ideas to be privatized sooner than is socially optimal. Choi and Gerlach (2014) study the R&D choice
between easy and di¢ cult projects that are complementary for the production of a nal product. They nd
that rms tend to invest excessively on the easy innovation due to hold-up problems.
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active at any point in time. He shows that the possibility of changing preferences can in-
duce ine¢ ciency because the returns from innovation are only realized for those generations
where the research line is commercially active. More recently, Hopenhayn and Squintani
(2016) investigate the incentive to innovate among multiple directions in a growth model,
nding that the equilibrium allocation of researchers across R&D lines is suboptimal, with
too many pursuing hotR&D lines. Bryan and Lemus (2016) consider a directional model
where rms both race toward easy projects and do not fully appropriate the value of their
inventions.10
In the rest of the paper, we describe our model and its equilibrium in Section 2. In Section
3, we establish our results on how the patentability standard a¤ects the rates of innovation,
as measured by the R&D intensities of each rm in the two directions and by the overall
R&D intensity of the industry, and how it a¤ects the direction of innovation, as measured
by the ratio of the innovation rates in the two directions. We also discuss to what extent
each of the main features of our model particularly multi-periods, uncertainty, multiple
research direction, and reward sizes is responsible for these e¤ects. Section 4 contains our
welfare results, comparing the equilibrium rate and direction of innovation with the social
optimum, and discussing optimal patentability policy as the second best. In Section 5, we
discuss how our ndings might be a¤ected if we relax the assumption that incumbents do
not engage in R&D or if patentability standards are state-dependent. Section 6 concludes.
Our main results are illustrated through a numerical example in Appendix A, and proofs
that are more technical in nature are relegated to Appendix B. Technical details analyzing
the extension with incumbent innovation are contained in Appendix C.
10They also show that patens can distort e¤ort towards either incremental or radical innovation and,
similarly as we do, nd that the second-best patent policy necessarily induces ine¢ ciency. Notice that while
our paper shares the common interest of the aforementioned two papers in considering innovation directions,
we analyze a rather di¤erent model and focus on the role of patentability standard, with insights on how it
impacts R&D directions and intensities, as well as on its optimal design.
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2 The Model
Time is continuous and is divided into periods, t = 0; 1; 2; :::; between stochastic discoveries
by innovating rms. There are n+1 rms in the industry, one of whom is the incumbent and
the others are challengers in each period. At period t; the incumbent, through a patented
innovation at an earlier period, can produce a product that has quality qt. Each of the
challengers conducts R&D to further improve the product quality.
There are two possible research directions for the challengers, direction A the safe di-
rection, and direction B the risky direction. A successful innovation through direction A
will result in a certain quality improvement, A:11 A successful innovation through direction
B will yield an uncertain quality improvement, B, which is a random variable with cu-
mulative distribution function G () and continuous density g () on support 0;B : As we
pointed out before, this formulation closely follows Hunt (2004), with the main di¤erence
being that he considers R&D only along a single uncertain direction corresponding to B
here:
A challenger decides on a R&D portfolio by choosing the R&D intensity in each of the two
directions. We assume that each innovation occurs according to a Poisson process. The cost
for a challenger to maintain an arrival rate z in research direction z 2 fA;Bg is C (z) ;12
which is strictly increasing and twice continuously di¤erentiable, with C (0) = C 0 (0) = 0,
C 00 () > 0; and limz!1C 0 (z) = 1.13 We shall also refer to z as the R&D intensity in
direction z:
11We can allow A to be stochastic, provided that its variance is su¢ ciently small.
12Our formulation implicitly assumes that a rms total R&D costs are C (A) +C (B) ; separable across
directions. We thus consider situations where R&D inputs are not substitutable between the two innovation
directions, possibly because for instance they require researchers who specialize in di¤erent technologies.
This is a restrictive assumption. It would be more realistic to allow the substition of R&D inputs between
alternative research directions, but the analysis could be much more complicated. We leave this for possible
future research.
13We follow Lee and Wilde (1980) in assuming that innovation is produced through ow costs, which, as
they point out, may generate additional innovation as rms enter, relative to the case where xed costs are
required for innovation (Loury, 1979). Notice that we allow the corner case where each rm chooses to
conduct R&D only in one direction. Under our assumptions on the cost function, however, the equilibrium
will be interior.
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The statutory life of a patent is assumed to be innite, even though the patent life
e¤ectively ends when the next patentable invention occurs. To be awarded a patent, the
quality improvement from an invention needs to meet a minimum improvement size, or
the patentability standard, S: In practice, the patentability standard (or requirement) can
correspond to the requirement of non-obviousness in the American patent code, or of the
inventive step in Europe. For the purpose of this paper, we assume that S 2 0; B and
S < A: Thus, an innovation achieved through the safe direction is always patentable,
whereas  (S)  1   G (S) is the probability that an innovation in the risky direction is
granted a patent. When an innovation is not protected by a patent, it becomes freely
available to the public, in which case we assume that competition drives the prot from
marketing the product to zero. Notice that the more stringent the patentability requirement,
other things equal, the smaller the probability that the challenger can protably market her
innovation achieved through the risky direction.
We assume that at the beginning of period t = 0; there is a large number of rms, each
deciding whether to pay a one-time xed investment cost k to enter the market. Thus,
the number of challengers, n; is endogenously determined by the free-entry condition. If a
challenger wins the race for a patentable innovation, it becomes the incumbent in the next
period, and the previous incumbent becomes a challenger. If a challenger succeeds in an
innovation that does not meet the patentability standard, then the incumbent maintains its
leader position, and all n+ 1 rms enter into a new period of patent race. The innovation
arrival rates and the costs to achieve them remain the same after any discovery, whether
patentable or not. Therefore, in either case, the relative positions of the n+ 1 rms in the
market are the same, and hence the choice problem for any rm in the market is stationary.
We denote the discount rate, common for all rms, by r:
The market contains a representative consumer, who demands one unit of the product
per period. The consumers valuation for a product is equal to its quality. The marginal cost
of production for any rm is normalized to zero. The incumbent and the challengers engage
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in price competition. Thus, when the incumbents product quality exceeds the next closest
quality by ; its ow prot is exactly  until the arrival of a new patentable innovation.
The challengers earn no ow prot.
As in Hunt (2004) and other studies in this literature, we shall focus on an equilibrium
where only challengers, but not the incumbent, will invest in R&D. Incumbents tend to
have lower incentive to invest in R&D than entrants due to their existing prot. The
assumption that they make no investment is more extreme, and it is made mainly for
analytical tractability. [We discuss in Section 5 how our analysis could be extended to a
setting where incumbents also engage in R&D.] Notice that in our model, players rotate
their roles as the incumbent and the challengers over time, so a rm may only temporarily
stop investing. In our analysis that follows, by construction, the strategies by the challengers
and the incumbent will constitute a stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE).14
We shall maintain the following assumption throughout the paper:
0 < rk < A  E [B] 
Z B
0
BdG (B) ; (A1)
because of two considerations: First, we wish to ensure that a positive number of rms
will be willing to enter the market to pursue innovation in each direction, which will require
0 < rk < A: Second, we are interested especially in situations where a successful innovation
in the risky direction yields a higher expected quality improvement, which is captured by
A < E [B] ; but we also allow A = E [B] in order to isolate the e¤ect of uncertainty:
If a challenger innovates through the safe direction, she becomes an incumbent and
receives a prot ow of
A = A (1)
until she is replaced by a future challenger. If the challenger succeeds in the risky direction;
14There could potentially be another equilibrium where an incumbent from direction B may conduct R&D
if the realized B > S is relatively small, but its analysis appears to be untractable.
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the expected prot ow (conditional on the innovation being patentable) is
B =
1
 (S)
Z B
S
BdG (B) : (2)
Notice that
@B
@S
=
 Sg (S)  (S) + g (S) R BS BdG (B)
[ (S)]2
=
g (S)
 (S)
(B   S)  0;
where B  S because
Z B
S
BdG (B) 
Z B
S
SdG (B) =  (S)S:
It follows that
B  B (S)  B (0) = E [B] :
This, together with (1) and assumption (A1), implies that B  A > rk > 0. Thus, entry
to pursue innovation in each direction can be protable. The equilibrium number of entrants
in the market will be determined simultaneously as the arrival rate of innovation in each
direction, as we show next.
Because all challengers are symmetric, we focus on stationary equilibria where they
choose identical R&D strategies. Specically, at such a stationary MPE, which is assumed
to exist uniquely, let V Iz be the value of being an incumbent through type-z innovation and
V E the value of being a challenger, all of which are evaluated at the beginning of a period.
Then V IA; V
I
B and V
E satisfy the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations15:
rV IA = A + n (A + B)
 
V E   V IA

; (3)
15Notice that the probability that any two innovations succeed simultaneously is zero. Because we are
constructing an equilibrium in which the incumbent does not invest, no matter what its realized quality
improvement is, the value function V IB below is not contingent on the realization of B .
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rV IB = B + n (A + B)
 
V E   V IB

; (4)
and
rV E = A
 
V IA   V E
  CA (A) + B  V IB   V E  CB (B) : (5)
Equations (3), (4) and (5) suggest that the value of being an incumbent depends on the
type of innovation that has led to the incumbency.16
From (5), the challenger chooses optimal A and B; which respectively satisfy the
rst-order conditions:17
C 0A (A) = V
I
A   V E ; (6)
and
C 0B (B) = 
 
V IB   V E

: (7)
The free entry condition implies
V E = k: (8)
From (3), (6) and (8), we nd
V IA   V E =
A   rk
r + n(A + B)
= C 0A (A) : (9)
Similarly, from (4), (7) and (8), we have
V IB   V E =
B   rk
r + n(A + B)
=
C 0B (B)

: (10)
Substituting (9) and (10) into (5) yields
AC
0
A (A) + BC
0
B (B)  CA (A)  CB (B)  rk = 0: (11)
16Note that the size of quality improvement appears with the corresponding probability, even though the
incumbent knows its exact value after innovation is successful. Hence B is shown in the right hand of (4).
We note again that in general there may be other equilibria, possibly with asymmetric R&D by entrants.
We focus on the specic equillibrium by assumption.
17The properties of the cost functions ensure that the second-order conditions are satised.
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The system of equations, (9), (10) and (11), determine the three equilibrium values A,
B and n. In particular, from (9) and (10), the equilibrium number of challengers can be
expressed as
n =

A   rk
C 0A (

A)
  r

 1
A + 

B
=

 (B   rk)
C 0B (

B)
  r

 1
A + 

B
: (12)
We illustrate the equilibrium of the model with an example in Appendix A.
3 The Rates and Direction of Innovation
We are now in a position to examine how the patentability standard, S; may a¤ect the
rates and direction of innovation. We rst consider the e¤ects of S on the equilibrium R&D
intensities, A and 

B, which can be viewed as each entrants innovation rates in the safe
and risky directions; respectively. Recall that A, 

B and n
 are determined by (9), (10)
and (11). In the appendix, we show the following by using the Cramers rule:
@A
@S
=
g(S)B(

A + 

B) [C
0
A (

A)]
2C
00
B (

B) (rk   S)
jM j (13)
and
@B
@S
=
 g(S)A(A + B) [C 0A (A)]2C
00
A (

A) (rk   S)
jM j ; (14)
where
jM j =  (A + B)C 0 (B)C
00
(A)C
00
(B) [

A(A   rk) + B(B   rk)] < 0
since B  A > rk. Thus, if S < rk; then @

A
@S < 0 and
@B
@S > 0; while if S > rk; then
@A
@S > 0 and
@B
@S < 0: This leads to the following result, where we dene
d (S)  

B
A
(15)
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as the innovation direction.
Proposition 1 As S increases, B rst increases and then decreases, whereas 

A rst
decreases and then increases, reaching the maximum and the minimum, respectively, at
S = rk. Moreover, innovation direction d (S) has an inverted-U shape, maximized at S = rk.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Interestingly, R&D intensities in both directions vary non-monotonically with S, in con-
trast to the result in Hunt (2004) that R&D intensity is invariant with the patentability
standard. As we discussed in the introduction, a marginal increase in S has both a threshold
and an incumbency-prolonging e¤ect: it reduces the probability of obtaining a patent in the
risky direction but increases the value of being an incumbent; the former can be attributed
to the uncertain size of risky innovations, while the latter is due to the multi-periods feature
of our model. The initial increase of B in S is driven by the incumbency-prolonging and
strategic substitution e¤ects, which outweigh the threshold e¤ect, whereas the latter e¤ect
dominates so that B decrease in S when S > rk: Another crucial force is the strategic
substitution e¤ect due to the presence of two research directions: When the R&D intensity
in one direction becomes lower (higher), it positively (negatively) impacts the R&D inten-
sity in the other direction due to (the reverse of) the incumbency-prolonging e¤ect. The
interactions of these three e¤ects are subtle, and together they jointly determine how B
and A vary with S:18
Thus, in the free entry equilibrium of our model, patentability standards impact industry
R&D not only through the number of rms (the extensive margin), but also through changes
in the R&D intensities in di¤erent directions (the intensive margin). Notice that in (14), if
A = 0, then 

B would be independent of S; and our results would coincide with Hunts.
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18Proposition 1, as well as our other results to follow, holds for E [B ]  A: Thus, our main results do
not depend on whether the expected innovation size is the same in the two diretions or is higher in direction
B. Notice also that our assumption on the strict convexity of C () ; which implies a motive for diversication
in R&D directions, is important for the unique existence of interior A and 

B , and hence it is also important
for the strategic substitution e¤ect.
19See the equation after (A.7) on pp. 421 in Hunt (2004), except that, in Hunt, (i) there is an industry-
specic productivity parameter, which we assume to be 1; and (ii) the reservation value of the product is
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In our model, innovation direction, d (S) ; is measured by each challengers R&D intensity
in the risky direction relative to that in the safe direction, which determines the relative
rates of innovation achieved through the two directions. The inverted-U shaped d (S) ; with
its maximum attained at S = rk; follows directly from the shapes of B (S) and 

A (S) :
Since the expected size of each innovation is weakly higher in the risky direction than in
safe direction, one might think that it would be desirable to choose S = rk: However, the
overall expected innovation rate of each challenger,
  AA + BE [B] = AA

1 + d(S)
E[B]
A

;
depends also on how di¤erent B (S) and 

A (S) are. Hence,  may not be maximized at
rk:
For the industry innovation rate, we need to further consider the number of entrants in
equilibrium (n), which is also a function of S: The equilibrium overall innovation rate of
the industry can be dened as:
R  n: (16)
The result below indicates that the shape of R  R (S) is consistent with that of d (S).
Proposition 2 As S rises, R initially increases and eventually decreases; reaching its max-
imum when S is at some intermediate level.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As in Hunt (2004), the industry rate of innovation (R) is maximized when the patentabil-
ity standard is neither too high nor too low. However, the channels through which S a¤ects
R di¤er in the two models. In Hunt, as S increases, the equilibrium number of rms to con-
duct R&D in the market rst increases and then decreases, whereas the equilibrium R&D
intensity remains unchanged. Our model entails a second channel: the changes in the R&D
the level of its quality multiplied by p, and we assume p = 1.
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intensities, since
@R
@S
= n
@
@S
+ 
@n
@S
;
and in our model, A and 

B and hence also  in general vary with S.
Dene SR as the patentability requirement that maximizes the innovation rate of the
industry R = R (S):
SR = argmax fR (S)g :
In Appendix B, we show that
@R
@S
jS=rk > 0; (17)
which immediately leads to:
Remark 1 If R is a single-peaked function of S; then SR > rk:
Therefore, the patentability standard that maximizes the overall rate of innovation in the
industry is higher than S = rk; which maximizes B; provided that R (S) is single-peaked.20
Results in this section and the next section will be illustrated in Example 1 of Appendix
A.
4 E¢ cient Innovation Incentive and Optimal S
In this section, we compare the equilibrium and the e¢ cient incentives for cumulative in-
novation, where e¢ cientmeans welfare-maximizing or the rst-best; and we study how
to choose S optimally at the market equilibrium. Specically, we seek to answer two ques-
tions. First, if one could directly choose the number of entrants and the R&D intensities
to maximize social welfare (i.e., the rst best), what would be these choices and how would
they di¤er from those in the market equilibrium? Second, if policy can choose patentability
20The single-peak condition on R is needed in Remark 1, because Proposition 2 does not rule out the
possibility that R has multiple peaks as S increases on [0;A). Notice also that we assume S < A: If S
were to be higher than A; then no innovation would happen in direction A and the result in Hunt (2004)
would directly imply SR > rk.
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standards, but not rmsinnovative activities, what should be the optimal S (i.e., the second
best)? Subsection 4.1 addresses the two questions in terms of the values for A; B; and n;
while subsection 4.2 considers the questions from the perspective of innovation directions.
4.1 Comparing R&D Intensities and the Number of Entrants
When there are n challengers, each choosing R&D intensities A and B in safe and risky
directions; respectively, total welfare is
W =
n
r

A
A
r
  CA (A) + BE [B]
r
  CB (B)  rk

; (18)
where Ar and
E[B ]
r are the expected social values of innovations generated by one inno-
vating rm through the safe and risky directions; respectively.21 The expression inside the
square brackets in (18) is thus the instantaneous social benet from one innovating rm,
and there are n independent innovating rms for the industry, multiplied by 1r to account
for the discounted sum of the instantaneous benets.
At the rst best where a hypothetical social planner directly chooses A; B and n to
maximize W; the welfare-maximizing oA and 
o
B satisfy the following rst-order conditions:
C 0 (oA) =
A
r
and C 0 (oB) =
E [B]
r
: (19)
Notice that the e¢ cient R&D intensities equate their marginal social benets and costs.
Comparing (19) to (9) and (10) and noticing that
 (B   rk) =
Z B
S
BdG (B)  rk < E [B] ; (20)
we nd that the e¢ cient R&D intensities are higher than those in the free entry equilibrium:
21Our model is one of quality ladders, where the benet of a quality improvement to the society lasts forever.
Thus, the expected social value of an innovation through the safe direction (discounted to the moment of
its discovery) is
R1
0
e rtAdt = Ar : Similarly, the expected social value of an innovation through the risky
direction is
R1
0
e rtE (B) dt =
E(B)
r
:
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oz > 

z; for z = A;B. Intuitively, the quality improvement from an innovation benets the
society permanently, but the innovating rm can capture the rents only before it is replaced
by the next innovation. Moreover, some quality improvements along direction B are not
patentable, which further lowers a rms innovation incentive below the e¢ cient level.
Moreover, since zC 0z (z)   C (z) increases in z and oz > z for z = A;B; utilizing
(19) and (11), we have
oA
A
r
  CA (oA) + oB
E [B]
r
  CB (oB)  rk
= oAC
0
A (
o
A)  CA (oA) + oBC 0B (oB)  CB (oB)  rk
> AC
0
A (

A)  CA (A) + BC 0B (B)  CB (B)  rk = 0: (21)
Hence, as in Hunt (2004), the e¢ cient number of rms is no =1 > n.
Summarizing the discussions above, we have:
Proposition 3 Compared to the rst-best, R&D intensities and the number of entrants are
decient under the free entry equilibrium.
We note two related points. First, the result that aggregate R&D intensity is higher
under the social optimum than under the market equilibrium does not rely on the number
of rms at the rst-best being innite. Second, the key to the result of decient entry is
that the expected social benet of adding one more rm exceeds the sum of its entry and
R&D costs. Our analysis has not considered other mechanisms, such as increasing rather
than constant marginal cost of production, that can also lead to decient entry.
When policy can choose the patentability standard whereas rms choose R&D intensities
under free entry to maximize their private benets, the optimal choice of S is also called
the second-best problem. Let W (S) be the welfare in equilibrium at the second best: Then,
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from (18),
@W (S)
@S
=
1
r
@n
@S

A
A
r
  CA (A) + B
E [B]
r
  CB (B)  rk

+
n
r

A
r
  C 0A (A)

@A
@S
+

E [B]
r
  C 0B (B)

@B
@S

: (22)
The optimal patentability standard, denoted by S; coincides with the one that maximizes
the number of entrants in Hunt (2004) if A  0: To see this, notice that if A  0, our
model reduces to that in Hunt (2004), implying @

A
@S = 0; and by (14)
@B
@S = 0: Hence,
@W (S)
@S = 0 implies
@n
@S = 0. However, in our model

A
r
  C 0A (A)

@A
@S
+

E [B]
r
  C 0B (B)

@B
@S

is generally not zero when @n

@S = 0; and thus the optimal patentability standard generally
di¤ers from the one that maximizes n.
From Remark 1, the S that maximizes the industry innovation rate (R) exceeds rk;
provided that R is a single-peaked function of S: If W is a single-peaked function of S; then
S also exceeds rk: To see this, note that, from (9), (10) and (20),
C 0A (

A) <
A
r
and C 0B (

B) <
 (B   rk)
r
<
E [B]
r
:
Thus, noticing @

A
@S jS=rk =
@B
@S jS=rk = 0 and @n

@S jS=rk > 0, we have
@W
@S
jS=rk = 1
r
@n
@S
jS=rk

A
A
r
  CA (A) + B
EB
r
  CB (B)  rk

>
1
r
@n
@S
jS=rk

AC
0
A (

A)  CA (A) + BC 0B (B)  CB (B)  rk

= 0;
where the equality follows from (11).
Summarizing the above discussion, we have:
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Remark 2 As a second-best, the patentability standard that maximizes W  W (S) ; S;
generally does not maximize the number of rms in the industry. Furthermore, if W (S) is
single-peaked, then S > rk:
Therefore, even though the expected quality improvement from an innovation can be
higher in the risky direction than in the safe direction, under the single-peak condition, the
welfare-maximizing S does not maximize innovation in the risky direction: This is because
by raising S above rk; industry innovation can be increased.
Notice that for S to be a valid solution to the maximization problem for W (S) ; we
have implicitly assumed that S  A: If this constraint is binding, then we would have
S = A: This is because if S > A; then no entrant would conduct R&D in the safe
direction so that A = 0 and the problem is the same as if the risky direction were the
only research direction: But since C 0A (0) = 0 by assumption, it is socially desirable to have
strictly positive R&D investment in the safe direction: This implies that W (S) would jump
down at S = A: Therefore, it is likely that S  A even if we allow S to be larger than
A:
4.2 Comparing the Innovation Directions
We now compare the equilibrium innovation direction d (S) with the innovation direction
that maximizes social welfare, do: From (19), we have
do =
oB
oA
; where
C 0 (oB)
C 0 (oA)
=
E [B]
A
:
Hence, at the welfare-maximizing innovation direction, the ratio of the marginal costs equals
the ratio of the marginal benets of innovations in the two directions.
Recall from Proposition 1 that the equilibrium innovation direction d (S) is maximized
at S = rk: The result below states that rms are biased towards (against) innovation in the
risky direction when S is below (above) some threshold. A sketch of the proof is as follows:
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If S = 0; we have d (S) > do; with a bias towards direction B: As S increases but is smaller
than rk, innovation is even more biased towards direction B because, from Proposition 1,
B=

A increases in S if S < rk: As S further increases and surpasses rk; 

B starts to
decrease and A to increase, and thus d (S) becomes smaller but can still be larger than do:
When S > S^; the threshold value of S; d (S) falls below do and monotonically decreases, so
that innovation direction is biased towards direction A: Formally:
Proposition 4 There exists S^ 2 rk;B such that dS^ = do; with d (S) > do if S < S^
but d (S) < do if S > S^:
Proof. From (19), under the social optimum,
C 0B (
o
B)
C 0A (
o
A)
=
EB
A
:
From (9) and (10), given S; in the free-entry equilibrium
C 0B (

B (S))
C 0A (

A (S))
=
 (S) [B (S)  rk]
A   rk :
Thus,
 (S) 
C0B(

B(S))
C0A(

A(S))
C0B(
o
B)
C0A(
o
A)
=
 (S) [B (S)  rk]
E [B]
A rk
A
:
As S increases,
 (S)   (S) [B (S)  rk]
rst increases and then decreases, reaching its maximum at S = rk; because
@ (S)
@S
=
@ (S)
@S
[B (S)  rk] +  (S) @B (S)
@S
=  g (S) [B (S)  rk] +  (S) g (S) [B (S)  S]
 (S)
=  g (S) (S   rk) :
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Moreover,  (0) = E [B] rk > 0 and 
 
B

= 0: Therefore, there exists a unique S^ > rk;
determined by


S^

= E [B]
A   rk
A
< E [B] ;
such that 

S^

= 1; with
d

S^

=
B

S^

A

S^
 = oB
oA
= do:
Moreover, since
 (0) =
 (0)
E [B]
A rk
A
=
E [B]  rk
E [B]
A rk
A
=
1  rkE[B ]
1  rkA
> 1
and 

B(S)
A(S)
 hence  (S) increases for S 2 [0; rk) but decreases for S 2

rk; S^

; we have
 (S) > 1 and 

B(S)
A(S)
> do if S < S^: Also, since B (S) decreases in S while 

A (S) increases
in S for S > rk; we have  (S) < 1 and 

B(S)
A(S)
< do if S > S^:
Therefore, S^ implements the welfare-maximizing innovation direction, provided that
S^ < A; innovation is biased towards B when S < S^; whereas it is biased towards A
when S > S^: To understand this result, note that the innovation direction that maximizes
social welfare, do; is invariant with patentability standard because all (patentable and un-
patentable) innovations will increase social benets. However, market incentives do change
as patentability standard varies. Specically, when the patentability standard is relatively
low, the risky research direction with uncertain innovation size is likely to yield a patent
even when the quality improvement is small, increasing the innovation incentive through
that direction. Reinforced by the incumbency-prolonging and strategic substitution e¤ect,
this motivates rms to conduct R&D in the risky direction excessively relative to the di-
rection with a certain innovation size. Conversely, when the patentability standard is high
enough, the direction with uncertain innovation size is unlikely to receive a patent even
when the quality improvement is relatively large, which unduly discourages R&D in that
direction.
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Notice that while S^ leads to the e¢ cient choice of research direction, it need not be the
welfare-maximizing S for W (S) in the second-best problem. This is because S also a¤ects
W (S) through n (S) ; as can be seen from (22), and thus S^ need not maximize W (S) :
Intuitively, the second-best choice of S; S; will generally involve a trade o¤ between two
policy goals: moving towards the e¢ cient R&D direction (do) and towards the e¢ cient
number of entrants (no). When S achieves the e¢ cient R&D direction, as S^ does, it does
not optimally balance the two goals, and hence in general S^ does not maximize W (S) (i.e.
S^ 6= S).
5 Discussion
For tractability, our model has made the restrictive assumptions that the incumbent does
not conduct R&D and that the patentability standard is exogenously given and xed. In
this section, we discuss how our analysis might change if these assumptions are relaxed.
In subsection 5.1, we illustrate, in a particular setting and with an example, that the
main insights of our model can still be valid when incumbents also conduct R&D. Subsection
5.2 further illustrates how our results might change if patentability standards are state-
dependent.
5.1 When Incumbents Also Conduct R&D
We have shown how patentability standards impact innovation through the threshold,
incumbency-prolonging, strategic substitution and market-structure e¤ects in a model where
each incumbent (the leader) is assumed not to innovate. The analysis for the situation where
the incumbent also conducts R&D is generally very complicated. This is because the in-
cumbent may invest di¤erent amounts of R&D after its successful innovation each time,
and if the incumbent keeps (luckily) succeeding there are innitely many states and R&D
strategies for the incumbent. In this case, there is no stationary equilibrium.
To get a avor of the analysis when incumbents can innovate, suppose that each incum-
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bent can conduct R&D in all periods of its incumbency and prot from all of its patented
technologies in a cumulative sense, until it is replaced by a challenger whose R&D starts
from the current state of technology. Then, an innite number of equations are needed to
describe the dynamic system in equilibrium, starting from
rV E = A
 
V IA   V E
  CA(A) + B  V IB   V E  CB(B); (23)
where V Iz , z 2 fA;Bg is, as before, the expected value of being an incumbent through type-z
innovation. These expected values depend on the incumbents further innovation. Hence:
rV IA = A + n(A + B)
 
V E   V IA

+AA
 
V IAA   V IA
  CA(AA) + BA  V IBA   V IA  CB(BA); (24)
and
rV IB = B + n(A + B)
 
V E   V IB

+AB
 
V IAB   V IB
  CA(AB) + BB  V IBB   V IB  CB(BB); (25)
where V Iz1z denotes the expected value of maintaining the leader position through type-z1
innovation for the incumbent who currently has a type-z technology, with z1 and z 2 fA;Bg.
But the values of V Iz1z depend on the incumbents further innovation, as described by
(AC-1) in Appendix C, where V Iz2z1z is the expected value of maintaining the leader position
through type-z2 innovation for the incumbent who currently has a type-z1 and a type-z
technology, for z2; z1; and z 2 fA;Bg. This process can potentially continue indenitely.
To gain insights on how the e¤ects might change when incumbents are allowed to innovate
in a setting that is still tractable, we next consider the case where the incumbent conducts
R&D until it succeeds at most one more time (i.e. it can succeed at most two consecutive
periods before stopping R&D). Then, all values of V Iz2z1z in (AC-1) are zero. In this case,
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the quality size by which the incumbent leads is z +z1 .
From (23)(25), we can obtain the rst-order conditions on A; B; AA; AB; BA; and
BB; as in (AC-2) of Appendix C: Substituting these conditions back into (23)(25) and
(AC-1), and using the free-entry condition V E = k, we obtain a system of seven equations,
as in (AC-3) of Appendix C, which determines the seven equilibrium values A, 

B, 

AA,
BA, 

AB, 

BB and n
: Appendix C also contains the expressions for industry innovation
direction d(S); industry innovation rate R, and total welfare W:
While we are unable to obtain analytical solutions to the system of equations in (AC-3),
we can numerically compute the equilibrium. Figure 2 plots A (S), 

B (S), d
 (S) ; n (S) ;
R (S) ; andW  (S) for S 2 [0; 0:3) of Example 2 in Appendix C: The curves in Figure 2 have
patterns that are broadly consistent with those in Figure 1, especially at the industry level.
Thus, our main results on how patentability standards impact innovation can be valid when
incumbents are allowed to engage in R&D as well. This is not entirely surprising because,
intuitively, the incumbent itself can be viewed as a new challenger, whose participation in
the patent race need not change the basic forces at work.
One notable di¤erence in Figure 2 is that as S increases, A (S) barely decreases initially
before increasing, and B (S) barely increases initially before decreasing, while the other
key relationships appear to have much more similar shapes as those in Figure 1. Thus,
allowing incumbents to also conduct R&D appears to make (initial) increases in S more
negatively impact innovation in the risky direction and more positively impact innovation
in the safe direction. Recall that when incumbents are assumed to conduct no R&D, the
incumbency-prolonging e¤ect plays a key role in leading to the initial decrease of A (S)
and initial increase of B (S). When incumbents can also innovate, a reduction of R&D
by new entrants has less impact on the duration of the incumbency, which weakens the
incumbency-prolonging e¤ect. This, together with the interaction with the threshold and
strategic substitution e¤ects, appears to be responsible for the main di¤erence between the
25
two gures.22
5.2 State-Dependent Patentability Standards
Our model has assumed that the patentability standard is exogenously given and xed.
It would also be interesting to examine the situation where the patentability standard
the quality improvement required to be granted a patent is endogenously determined and
depends on the current technology state of the industry.23 One major di¢ culty, however, is
that rmsR&D strategies will no longer be stationary under state-dependent patentability
standards, which makes it a formidable task to analyze the problem generally.
To illustrate some possible new insights and implications, we consider a particular state-
dependent patentability policy under which the current patentability standard is set as high
as the one in the patent that was previously granted (Amano, 2016). Specically, the state-
dependent patentability policy denes a patentability standard in the risky direction, St; at
time t as
St = DB (t) ;
where DB (t) is the size of the most recent innovation (at time t) that has been granted a
patent. Note that in our main model with xed patentability, St is invariant over time.
Our rst and obvious observation is that under the state-dependent patentability
policy, the patentability standard will gradually increase over time.
We next compare innovation incentives under the xed and state-dependent patentability
policies. In particular, we consider the question: at any moment t; if innovating rms face
the same patentability standard under the two policies, which policy will induce higher R&D
22Our specic formulation of the incumbent innovation assumes that an incumbent increases its quality
lead additively when it has multiple innovations. Suppose instead that when an incumbent succeeds in a
new innovation, its earlier lead is partially replaced, possibly due to leakages of its earlier technology. Then,
the usual replacement e¤ect will become more pronounced, reducing the incentives of incumbent innovation.
Consequently, the incumbency-prolonging e¤ect and our results would be less a¤ected if incumbents are
allowed to conduct R&D.
23Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) take into account state-dependent patent length in a framework of step-
by-step innovation.
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investment?
As in our main model, the innovation incentives here are mainly determined by the
threshold, incumbency-prolonging, and strategic substitution e¤ects. Under the same patentabil-
ity standard, a rm faces the same di¢ culty in obtaining a patent from innovation (the
threshold e¤ect). However, the incumbency-prolonging e¤ect is stronger under the state-
dependent patentability policy because an innovating rm expects a higher future patentabil-
ity standard after its successful patentable innovation and thus a longer incumbency. Hence,
the R&D intensity is higher in the risky direction under state-dependent patentability policy
due to a stronger incumbency-prolonging e¤ect. Moreover, the R&D incentive is lower in
the safe direction because a higher R&D intensity in one direction reduces the innovation
incentive of the other direction (the strategic substitution e¤ect). We thus have the following
remark.
Remark 3 Given a patentability standard St; rms have higher (lower) incentives to invest
in the risky (safe) direction under the state-dependent patentability policy than under the
xed patentability policy.
We may also ask how equilibrium R&D intensities in di¤erent directions and industry
innovation change with the endogenously determined patent policy over time. Recall that
in our model with a xed patentability standard, R&D intensities in the risky and safe
directions are time-invariant but from Proposition 1 as S rises, R&D intensity in the risky
(safe) direction rst increases (decreases) and then decreases (increases). Moreover, from
Proposition 2, as S rises, innovation innovation initially increases and eventually decreases.
Since the patentability standard increases over time under the state-dependent patentability
policy, Propositions 1 and 2 imply the following:
Remark 4 Under the state-dependent patentability policy, it is possible that, over time,
R&D intensity in the risky (safe) direction rst increases (decreases) and eventually de-
creases (increases). Moreover, industry innovation will initially increase but eventually de-
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crease.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper has provided a rst look at how patent policy may impact the rate and direction of
cumulative innovation when rms can conduct R&D in multiple directions. We have three
main ndings: (i) Patentability standards a¤ect the rate of industry innovation through
both the number of entrants and their R&D intensities in the free entry equilibrium. As
S rises, the rate of industry innovation initially increases and eventually decreases. (ii)
Compared to the social optimum, market incentives for cumulative innovation are decient
for both R&D intensities and the number of entrants. (iii) There exists a critical level of
patentability standard (S^) under which the innovation direction is e¢ cient, whereas R&D
is biased towards (against) the risky direction when S is below (above) S^: However, if S
is the only policy variable available, then the optimal policy, which balances the trade-o¤
between the rate and direction of innovation, will in general be di¤erent from S^:
Discussions about patent policy and the patent system have frequently surrounded the
issue of patentability standards. It has been argued that patentability standards in the
U.S. are too low, leading to excessive incentives for small-size innovations (e.g., Hunt, 2004;
Ja¤e, 2000). Our results suggest that raising patentability standards may indeed improve
innovation direction, with two caveats: rst, the e¤ect of a higher S on innovation direction
may be non-monotonic, and a small increase in S can either alleviate or exacerbate possible
direction biases depending on the starting point; second, in our model, the risky direction
may lead to more small-size innovations but to a higher expected size than the safe direction.
Hence, even when raising S reduces the patenting of small-size innovations, it may not raise
the expected innovation size.
In our model, the xed setup cost for R&D (adjusted by r), rk; plays important roles
in determining the innovation incentives and the optimal patentability standards. This
cost generally di¤ers for di¤erent industries. For instance, it is likely much larger in the
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pharmaceutical industry than in the software industry. Thus, it would be desirable that
patentability standards di¤er for di¤erent industries, depending (indirectly) on the setup
cost for R&D projects. Moreover, innovations in developing countries tend to be much
below the world technology frontier and require lower setup cost rk than those in devel-
oped countries. Then, the desirable patentability requirement could be lower in developing
countries in order to promote innovation.24
24Chen and Puttitanun (2005) shows how intellectual property rights (IPRs) a¤ect innovations in devel-
oping countries and how the optimal IPRs policy may vary with a countrys level of development.
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Appendix A: An Illustrative Example
We illustrate the main theoretical results in this paper through Example 1 below.
Example 1. Suppose that B follows the uniform distribution on [0; 1], while CA(A) =
1
2
2
A and CB(B) = 5
2
B. Then, from (9), (10) and (11):
A =
vuuut 2rk
1 + 0:1

(1 S)( 1+S
2
 rk)
A rk
2 ;
B =
vuuut 2rk
10 + 100

A rk
(1 S)( 1+S
2
 rk)
2 ;
and
n =

A   rk
A
  r

 1
A + (1  S)B
:
Assume r = 0:08, k = 1:2, A = 0:3, and let S = 0:1 which is close to rk = 0:096. Then
A = 0:3701, 

B = 0:0742, and n
 = 1:0785.
(a). First, S is allowed to vary. Figure 1 below plots A, 

B, d, n
, R andW as functions
of S 2 [0; 0:3), where A(S), B(S) and d(S) reach the minimum 0.3701 and the maxima
0.0742 and 0.2004, respectively, at SfA;B ;dg = rk = 0:096, illustrating Proposition 1.
(b). Next, R(S) in Figure 1 reaches the maxima 0.1618 at SR = 0:2494, greater than
rk = 0:096, illustrating Proposition 2 and Remark 1.
(c). In Figure 1, A(S), 

B(S) and n
(S) reach the maxima 0.3755, 0.0742 and 1.0912
at Smax = 0:3, SfA;B ;dg = 0:096 and Sn = 0:24, respectively. Therefore, 

A(S) < 
o
A =
A
r = 3:75, 

B(S) < 
o
B =
E(B)
r = 0:625, and n
(S) < no = 1, for all S 2 [0; 0:3). This
illustrates Proposition 3 for all feasible S < A = 0:3. That is, compared to the rst-best,
R&D intensities and the number of entrants under the free entry equilibrium are decient,
no mater where the feasible patentability standard is.
(d). Moreover, W (S) in Figure 1 reaches the maximum 22.6586 at S = 0:2506, which
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is not equal to Sn = 0:24, and is greater than rk = 0:096. Then, as a second-best, the
patentability standard that maximizes W (S) does not maximize the number of rms in the
industry, and is greater than the patentability standard that minimizes A(S) and maximizes
B(S) and d(S). This illustrates Remarks 2.
(e). Notice that
(B   rk) = (1  S)
 R 1
S xdx
1  S   0:096
!
= (1  S)

1 + S
2
  0:096

;
and
E[B]
A   rk
A
= 0:34:
Thus, from
(1  S)

1 + S
2
  0:096

= 0:34;
we obtain S^e = 0:4664, greater than rk = 0:096 and A, such that S^e is a corner solution
to Proposition 4, as S 2 [0; 0:3) in this example.
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Figure 1: Example 1
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Appendix B: Proofs
Appendix B contains proofs for Proposition 1, Proposition 2, and (17).
Proof of Proposition 1. From (3), (4) and (5), the equilibrium A; 

B and n
 solve the
system of equations below:
M 
266664
M1  C 0A (A) [r + n(A + B)]  (A   rk)
M2  AC 0A (A) + BC 0B (B)  CA (A)  CB (B)  rk
M3  C 0A (A) (B   rk)  C 0B (B) (A   rk)
377775 = 0
LetM ij  @M
i
@j ; for i = 1; 2; 3 and j = A; B; S; n. Dene jMAS j ; jMBS j ; jMnS j and jM j
as the determinants of matrix MAS ; MBS ; MnS and M , respectively:
jMAS j =

M1S M
1
B
M1n
M2S M
2
B
M2n
M3S M
3
B
M3n

; jMBS j =

M1A M
1
S M
1
n
M2A M
2
S M
2
n
M3A M
3
S M
3
n

;
jMnS j =

M1A M
1
B
M1S
M2A M
2
B
M2S
M3A M
3
B
M3S

and jM j =

M1A M
1
B
M1n
M2A M
2
B
M2n
M3A M
3
B
M3n

:
By Cramers rule25, we have
@A
@S
=  jMAS jjM j and
@B
@S
=  jMBS jjM j :
25Cramers rule is a standard way of nding the partial derivative of an independent variable in a system
of equations. See, for example, Chiang and Wainwright (2005) for an introduction to Cramers rule.
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We next compute the relevant derivatives:
M1A = [r + n(A + B)]C
00
A (A) + nC
0
A (A) ; M
1
B
= nC 0A (A) ;
M1n = (A + B)C
0
A (A) ; M
1
S =  g(S)nBC 0A (A) ;
M2A = AC
00
A (A) ; M
2
B
= BC
00
B (B) ;
M2n = 0; M
2
S = 0; M
3
A
= (B   rk)C 00A (A) ; M3B =  (A   rk)C 00B (B) ;
M3n = 0; M
3
S = g(S)C
0
A (A) (rk   S):
Thus,
jMAS j = M1SM2BM3n +M1BM2nM3S +M1nM2SM3B  M1nM2BM3S  M1BM2SM3n  M1SM2nM3B
=  g(S)B(A + B)
 
C 0A
2
C 00B(rk   S);
jMBS j = M1AM2SM3n +M1SM2nM3A +M1nM2AM3S  M1nM2SM3A  M1SM2AM3n  M1AM2nM3S
= g(S)A(A + B)
 
C 0A
2
C 00A(rk   S);
and
jM j = M1AM2BM3n +M1BM2nM3A +M1nM2AM3B  M1nM2BM3A  M1BM2AM3n  M1AM2nM3B
=  (A + B)C 0BC 00AC 00B[A(A   rk) + B(B   rk)] < 0:
Therefore,
@A
@S
=  jMAS jjM j =
g(S)B(

A + 

B) (C
0
A)
2C 00B(rk   S)
jM j ;
and
@B
@S
=  jMBS jjM j =
 g(S)A(A + B) (C 0A)2C 00A(rk   S)
jM j :
It follows that @

B
@S > 0 and
@A
@S < 0 if S < rk and
@B
@S < 0 and
@A
@S > 0 if rk < S.
This further implies that B=

A; same as 

B; is an inverted-U function of S; maximized at
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S = rk:
Proof of Proposition 2. By Cramers rule,
@n
@S
=  jMnS jjM j :
where
jMnS j = g(S)C 0AC 00AC 00B
8><>: nB[A(A   rk) + B(B   rk)]+B(rk   S)[r + n(A + B)]
9>=>;
+g(S)n
 
C 0A
2  
BC
00
B   AC 00A

](rk   S): (AB-1)
From (13), (14) and (AB-1), we can show that, after substitution and simplication,
@R
@S
= (AA+BE[B])
@n
@S
+A
@A
@S
+E[B]
@B
@S
=
 g(S)C 0A
8>>>><>>>>:
(AA + BE[B])C
00
AC
00
BB[nA(A   S)
+nB(B   S) + r(rk   S)]
+nC 0A(E[B]  A)
 
2AC
00
A + 
2
BC
00
B

(rk   S)
9>>>>=>>>>;
jM j : (AB-2)
Note that E[B]  A since   1: If S = 0; then S < min fA;B; rkg : It follows that
@R
@S jS=0 > 0: If S = B; then S  max fA;B; rkg and we have @R@S jS=B < 0.
Proof of (17). From (AB-2),
@R
@S

S=rk
=
 g(S)C 0A
jM j (AA + BEB)C
00
AC
00
BB[nA(A   rk) + nB(B   rk)] > 0:
That is (17).
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Appendix C8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
rV IAA = A +A + n (A + B)
 
V E   V IAA

+AAA
 
V IAAA   V IAA
  CA (AAA) + BAA  V IBAA   V IAA  CB (BAA) ;
rV IBA = B +A + n (A + B)
 
V E   V IBA

+ABA
 
V IABA   V IBA
  CA (ABA) + BBA  V IBBA   V IBA  CB (BBA) ;
rV IAB = A + B + n (A + B)
 
V E   V IAB

+AAB
 
V IAAB   V IAB
  CA (AAB) + BAB  V IBAB   V IAB  CB (BAB) ;
rV IBB = B + B + n (A + B)
 
V E   V IBB

+ABB
 
V IABB   V IBB
  CA (ABB) + BBB  V IBBB   V IBB  CB (BBB) ;
(AC-1)
8>>>><>>>>:
V IA   V E = C 0A (A) ; 
 
V IB   V E

= C 0B (B) ;
V IAA   V IA = C 0A (AA) ; 
 
V IBA   V IA

= C 0B (BA) ;
V IAB   V IB = C 0A (AB) ; 
 
V IBB   V IB

= C 0B (BB) ;
(AC-2)
and 8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
rk = AC
0
A (A)  CA (A) + BC 0B (B)  CB (B) ;
[r + n(A + B)]C
0
A (A) = A   rk + AAC 0A (AA)  CA (AA)
+BAC
0
B (BA)  CB (BA) ;
[r + n(A + B)]C
0
B (B) = B   rk + ABC 0A (AB)  CA (AB)
+BBC
0
B (BB)  CB (BB) ;
[r + n(A + B)] [C
0
A (AA) + C
0
A (A)] = 2A   rk;
[r + n(A + B)] [C
0
B (BA) + C
0
A (A)] = B + A   rk;
[r + n(A + B)] [C
0
A (AB) + C
0
B (B)] = A + B   rk;
[r + n(A + B)] [C
0
B (BB) + C
0
B (B)] = 2B   rk:
(AC-3)
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The overall innovation direction of the industry is
d(S) =
B + 

A

BAmin
n
1
AA+

BA
; 1n(A+

B)
o
+B

BBmin
n
1
AB+

BB
; 1n(A+

B)
o
A + 

A

AAmin
n
1
AA+

BA
; 1n(A+

B)
o
+B

ABmin
n
1
AB+

BB
; 1n(A+

B)
o
; (AC-4)
where 1n(A+B)
is the expected incumbency, nz is the R&D intensity in direction
z 2 fA;Bg for the n challengers per period, AA+B is the probability that an incum-
bent replaces the previous incumbent through type-A innovation, 

B
A+

B
is the prob-
ability that an incumbent replaces the previous incumbent through type-B innovation,
min
n
1
AA+

BA
; 1n(A+

B)
o
is the e¤ective time for the incumbent who currently holds
a type-A patented technology to conduct R&D until it successfully innovates a patented
technology or is replaced by a challenger26, min
n
1
AB+

BB
; 1n(A+

B)
o
is the e¤ective
time for the incumbent who currently holds a type-B patented technology to conduct R&D
until it successfully innovates a patented technology or is replaced by a challenger, and z0z
is the R&D intensity in direction z0 2 fA;Bg for the incumbent who currently holds a type-z
patented technology with z 2 fA;Bg.
Similar to the above reasoning, the overall innovation rate of the industry, R, and total
welfare, W , can be respectively determined as follows:
26 If the incumbent currently holds a type-A patented technology, 1
n(
A
+
B
)
is the expected incumbency,
and 1

AA
+
BA
is the expected duration for the incumbent to conduct R&D until it successfully innovates
a patented technology. The incumbent will conduct R&D until it is replaced by a challenger or successfully
innovates a patented technology. So the e¤ective time for the incumbent to conduct R&D is the smaller of
1
n(
A
+
B
)
and 1

AA
+
BA
.
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R(S) = n (AA + 

BE[B])
+Bn
min

1
AB + 

BB
;
1
n(A + 

B)

(ABA + 

BBE[B])
+An
min

1
AA + 

BA
;
1
n(A + 

B)

(AAA + 

BAE[B]) ;(AC-5)
and
W (S) =
n
r

A
A
r
  CA(A) + B
E[B]
r
  CB(B)  rk

+
An
r

AA
A
r
  CA(AA) + BA
E[B]
r
  CB(BA)

min

1
AA + 

BA
;
1
n(A + 

B)

+
Bn
r

AB
A
r
  CA(AB) + BB
E[B]
r
  CB(BB)

min

1
AB + 

BB
;
1
n(A + 

B)

: (AC-6)
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Example 2. As in Example 1, B follows the uniform distribution on [0; 1], CA(A) = 12
2
A
and CB(B) = 52B. Then, from (AC-3),8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
rk = 12
2
A + 5
2
B;
[r + n(A + B)]A = A   rk + 122AA + 52BA;
[r + n(A + B)] 10B = B   rk + 122AB + 52BB;
[r + n(A + B)] (AA + A) = 2A   rk;
[r + n(A + B)] (10BA + A) = B + A   rk;
[r + n(A + B)] (AB + 10B) = A + B   rk;
[r + n(A + B)] (10BB + 10B) = 2B   rk:
(AC-7)
where  = 1  S and B = (1 + S)=2.
Assume r = 0:08, k = 1:2, A = 0:3, and let S vary. By numerical computation, we can
plot A, B, AA, BA, AB, BB and n as functions of S 2 [0; 0:3) in Figure 2 which show
shapes similar to those in Figure 1, respectively.
42
Figure 2: Example 2
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